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Abstract
I discuss problems importing evolutionary language into the study of religion. It is not impossible 
to do, but it is difficult to carry out properly in practice. I suggest five criteria for scholarship in the 
study of religion to amount to good science when incorporating such language. They are 1) avoid-
ing just-so storytelling as much as possible 2) the requirement to add a compelling level of expla-
nation beyond the historical narrative 3) clearly distinguishing between proximate and ultimate 
forms of causation and explanation, and favoring proximate causes where possible 4) addressing 
the specific content of religion directly as part of the narrative 5) being explicit about the genre of 
scholarship undertaken, whether science-writing, humanistic exploration, or some mix of the 
two. Wiebe and Martin’s arguments do not end up rising to the challenge that they themselves 
have instigated to have a truly scientific study of religion.
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Wiebe’s title may appear to suggest that he plans to explain the origin of reli-
gion, however this is not the case. He wishes to explain the origin of “religions,” 
by which he means those institutional forms of religion that arose after the 
agricultural revolution in Eurasia, “the first epidemiological transition.” When 
human beings began to settle in great number, major diseases and in turn 
epidemics got hold for the first time. Religions became behavioral immune 
systems that kept these diseases out by regulating contact with out-groups. 
Modern conditions since the industrial revolution involve new human means 
to combat diseases and epidemics (the discovery of germ theory) and as such 
presently religions are no longer needed for that purpose and thus become, as 
Wiebe says, auto-immune diseases themselves.
Martin argues that Mithraism was a response to “anxiety” produced by the 
cosmological revolution when the three-tiered model of the cosmos (under-
world, world, heavens) was replaced by a Ptolemaic model of the earth as a 
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sphere in the infinity of space. The latter provoked a kind of existential angst 
that Martin sees Mithraism solving. Martin argues that religion and ritual are 
part of a cognitive mechanism in humans that is active in response to general 
threats in our environment. In Martin’s model, the human hazard precaution 
system evolved as a better-safe-than-sorry mechanism in the face of uncertain 
environments. The by-product of this mechanism is “anxiety.” Religion in this 
model seems be both the cause of the anxiety, as an overactive system for 
detecting signs of potential danger, and relief from it, through ritual and other 
means. While anxiety is a human universal, Martin argues that Hellenistic 
anxiety has a particular source (infinite space). Mithraism was a response to 
that source.
While I have some real sympathy with their efforts, these articles give me 
the opportunity to discuss some of the methodological (and theoretical) prob-
lems we arrive at when importing evolutionary language into the study of reli-
gion. I myself have probably fallen victim to them at one point or another. The 
one point I will not address is the obvious stumbling block that Wiebe and 
Martin are offering blatant functional explanations, an undertaking replete 
with problems they know well from Hans Penner, who thought that function-
alism was a form of religious thinking on the part of scholars of religion. Ironi-
cally, the illogical teleology behind functionalism reminded him of the kind of 
teleological thinking in religion; functionalism, in effect, becomes a superhu-
man agent.1 In a further irony, Martin and Wiebe themselves (2012) have 
recently articulated a similar idea as part of there own criticism of unscientific 
thinking, saying that, “despite advances in scientific knowledge, which are 
characterized by the replacement of agent causality with natural causality, 
most people—including scientists and scholars—nevertheless tend to fall 
back on agent causality to make everyday sense of the world” (593).
I will not pursue the issue of functionalism, since at least with regard to evo-
lutionary theories of religion, that ship has sailed. I want to simply note that 
because of our natural biases evolutionary functionalism should be regarded 
with extreme skepticism as an initial point of departure.
Instead I hope to sail elsewhere and try to describe some other limitations to 
applying evolutionary theory to the study of religion. I do not think it is impos-
sible, just very hard to do in practice. The criteria below, when met, would be 
1 This sentiment is reflected in Penner (2002: 154) and other sources (Penner 1999: 250) where 
he playfully wonders why the false (or illogical) reasoning behind functionalism, like false belief 
in religion, persists: “However, since it has been amply demonstrated that functionalism is illogi-
cal if not false when applied to cultural systems, we way well wonder why this doctrine persists, 
and what needs it fulfills among scholars in the academy!” Solomon puts it another way, saying, 
“evolution is the new magic wand, which with a wave changes something inexplicable into some-
thing only seemingly explained” (Solomon 1998: 5, quoted in Sesardic 2003: 428).
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sufficient to amount to good thinking. Let us call these criteria 1) avoiding just-
so storytelling/Molière’s sleeping pill,2 2) adding to the historical narrative?, 3) 
proximate/ultimate, 4) genre, 5) role of religion.
The first of these is a not a problem in itself. Any attempt to explain human 
behaviors with evolution will involve some version of just-so storytelling. Hard 
science, while aimed at falsification and asymptotic truth,3 is still also at the 
same time a form of storytelling. But there are better and worse stories, from a 
scientific perspective. It is easy to concoct a seemingly plausible story about 
evolution. The term “just-so story” comes from the title of Rudyard Kipling’s 
book of children’s stories, about how camels got their humps and leopards 
their spots. Since camels already have humps and leopards already have spots, 
we jump to the conclusion that such characteristics serve a function.
We have an implicit bias to think that things that have a function got them 
on purpose, through some design. An evolutionary story provides that design. 
Aside from the problematic assumption that the characteristic functions in the 
proposed manner (which is rarely actually shown in functional accounts), the 
direct line between the function and the story oversimplifies the process of 
natural selection so much that we should not even call it that anymore. Evolu-
tion does not work in the same way as a story. A story has a beginning, middle, 
and an end—a telos. Evolution has no telos. It is a blind process, one in which 
“the causal processes that produce new designs in the evolution of life are 
largely random with respect to any functions that those novelties might 
assume” (Frankenberry 2012: 600).
So importing narrative language into evolutionary explanation, while nec-
essary (since explanations are stories), is automatically dangerous: we have to 
be very careful. This tendency of some evolutionary explanations to downplay 
the randomness and complexity that eventually leads in some partial way to 
an adaptation—where evolution is described as a force, as some straight line 
driving history—leaves it vulnerable to accusations of “Panglossianism,” Dr. 
Pangloss being Voltaire’s overly optimistic character in Candide who “claimed 
that our noses were designed to carry spectacles, based on the fact that our 
noses support spectacles efficiently” (Wrangham 2009: 45; Sesardic 2003: 427). 
This tendency is of course exacerbated in any attempt to account for culture in 
evolutionary terms because human history is partly a story of auto-domestica-
tion and artificial selection; in other words, cultural “evolution” is not always 
blind. This fact may be a stumbling block in the attempt to import evolution-
ary theory without metaphor into cultural science, or it might be a brick wall.
2 In the play The Imaginary Invalid, a character makes fun of some doctors’ explanation of the 
sleep inducing powers of opium as arising from its “virtus dormitiva” (“dormative” power).
3 Think of the curve as “truth,” and the line, as the “science” we use to approximate it.
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I. Avoiding just-so Stories 
In a clear exposition of the subject in response to Griffiths (1997) critique of the 
evolutionary account of emotions, Neven Sesardic (2003) describes the three 
requirements that go into making just-so stories more compelling from a sci-
entific perspective (and thus for him not in fact just-so stories). Sesardic relates 
an example of an explanation that he thinks is a best-case scenario for fulfilling 
these requirements: the evolutionary explanation of human jealousy (particu-
larly male jealousy). I will briefly present his argument and then lay out the 
next few topics from my list that an evolutionary approach to religion (like the 
cognitive science of religion) has to be particularly careful about. The three 
requirements are:
 I. theoretical entrenchment
 II. predictive success
III. the failure of rival explanations.
 (I.)  By theoretical entrenchment Sesardic means that a thesis under consid-
eration has as part of its background “a more fundamental theory that is 
empirically well-confirmed across a very wide range of phenomena” 
(430). The fundamental theory he sees behind the evolutionary explana-
tion of male jealousy is Trivers’s theory of parental investment. The the-
ory is that humans are one of the few species that require bi-parental 
“investment” in childrearing. But since men cannot be guaranteed of 
their fatherhood (unlike in some other species), jealous behavior is 
selected for as a “solution” to that “evolutionary problem.” He regards 
this theory as extremely well supported. 
 (II.)  Predictive success involves the operationalization of a given thesis in the 
context of the well-entrenched theory. The more empirical evidence to 
support the thesis, the better. In the case of male jealousy, Sesardic notes 
four kinds of strong evidence: the ethnographic record, psychological 
research, statistical data about family violence, causes of conjugal disso-
lution in a number of cultures.
(III.)  The success of one theory is partly relative to rival theories. When other 
theories are operationalized and prove unsuccessful empirically, this 
lends support to those theories that are successful empirically. Compet-
ing theories are a very good thing indeed. When two competing theories 
can both be operationalized and one proved more convincing empiri-
cally than the other, it gives us even better reason for a provisional accep-
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tance of the convincing theory (until another alternative comes along!).4 
Ideally, requirement (III.) involves a variety of competing theories. This 
requirement is partly the reason why science is time-consuming and 
expensive, requiring a critical mass of people working on the same prob-
lem at once.5
II. Pitfalls Specific to Religion
(2)  Do we need it? Does the cognitive or evolutionary narrative add anything 
to our understanding of a historical situation beyond surface description?
Martin’s abstract states that “cognitive historiography” employs cognitive sci-
ence and evolutionary theory for “understanding the complexities of the his-
torical data.” At the same time, he spends a great deal of energy at the beginning 
of the essay arguing that the simplification of data is necessary for explanation. 
There is a deep conflict here between the simplification necessary to apply the 
kinds of general theories that cognitive sciences employ and the “complexities 
of the historical data.”6
(3)  Are we presented with a clear indication of the relationship between prox-
imate and ultimate causes or explanations?
Though this is a big debate in evolutionary theory, it seems pretty clear to me 
that science should be primarily concerned with proximate causation and 
explanation. Ultimate causes and explanations are much broader and more 
abstract than proximate ones from a metaphysical perspective. Ultimate expla-
nations are extremely useful and play nicely with intuitive human psychology 
(where we look for teleological reasons for things), but it is the proximate 
mechanisms behind evolution that should be the bread and butter in a scien-
tific theory. For example, Weiner (1994) gives us a beautiful account of the 
4 The example Sesardic uses has recently been challenged in a meta-analysis of the data; see 
Carpenter 2012. As far as the science is concerned, this type of challenge is a good thing, because 
it will lead to the refinement of the thesis.
5 It is also partly for this reason McCauley thinks that a possible scientific approach to religion 
would be “difficult,” “expensive,” and “complicated,” among other challenges (McCauley 2012: 605).
6 As Wiebe himself says elsewhere: the suggestion that “the historian could escape the messi-
ness of the contingency and subjectivity involved in accounting for individual events, and the 
persons engaged in them, is seriously flawed” (2011: 167). Wiebe thinks the contingency and sub-
jectivity of historical events calls for explanatory pluralism.
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details about proximate mechanisms with regard to Darwin’s favorite exam-
ple: the beaks of Galápagos finches.
We have to be careful in thinking about selection that we do not think of it 
as a force of some kind. We easily slip into this type of thinking, but selection is 
a post facto descriptive term. It simply means that looking back at a long his-
torical record certain genes and epi-genes that lead to certain traits become 
more common than other traits. There is nothing inherent in the genes that 
make them want to survive, they are not selfish in that sense. With regard to 
the explanation of jealousy, the genes of a father do not want the genes of his 
biological children to survive more than other children. Rather, over the long 
hall, genes and epi-genes that lead to jealous behavior became more common 
than other types of genes because fathers who controlled the sexuality of their 
mates could be more sure of their paternity and thus more willing to invest in 
raising children, thus leading to more “successful” children, evolutionarily 
speaking.
The proximate mechanism here concerns the “because” and it is debatable, 
in particular because we must account for why this evolutionary “solution” 
rather than another was selected for. For example, from a biological perspective 
other mechanisms could be selected for that help certify one’s fatherhood—and 
here the just-so nature of these arguments rears its head again. Furthermore, 
another issue is that near-certainty about paternity is a completely different 
mechanism than jealousy, showing the complexity of making any evolutionary 
account.7 Nevertheless, the thesis makes the unambiguous claim that fathers 
who are more sure of their paternity are more likely to “invest” more in their 
children.
In the case of Martin and Wiebe, what are the proximate mechanisms, and 
what is the ultimate descriptive mechanism? I think we get a good sense of 
what they see as the ultimate mechanisms. For Wiebe, sedentary (agricultural 
or probably Axial age) Eurasian religions (not “religion” as such) evolved to 
solve the problem of diseases spreading through new contact between groups. 
For Martin, religion (Mithraism?) emerged as a byproduct of the hazard 
precaution system that evolved to “solve” other “evolutionary problems.” But 
the proximate mechanisms seem to be a much more complicated and 
unfounded.
7 This discussion partly concerns the difference and relation between proximate and ultimate 
mechanisms. In the strictest scientific sense we could claim that there are only proximate mecha-
nisms, the ultimate mechanisms being narrative devices we use to describe the historical record 
over a long period of time.
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The background theories are relatively well supported: in the case of Martin, 
it is the research on the relation between ritual and the hazard precaution sys-
tem. In the case of Wiebe, it is research on behavioral immune systems. But is 
Martin offering an evolutionary argument for the origin of Mithraism or simply 
saying Mithraism fits into the evolutionary picture of religion that CSR has put 
together? If it is the former, he has not shown proximate or ultimate mecha-
nisms (to the extent that someone like Sesardic would like), and if it is the lat-
ter, it does not seem to locate anything specific about Mithraism that would 
justify the use of evolutionary theory. For Wiebe, we are never given an indica-
tion that there is anything special about “religions,” as opposed to any form of 
collective identity, that makes it particularly well suited to “solve” the proposed 
evolutionary problem. This gets into the next problem specific for evolutionary 
accounts of religion.
(4) Religion: Does the argument in question address religion directly?
In Wiebe’s paper, he argues that the term “religions” describes specific socio-
political institutions whose members have “a peculiar range of thought and 
behaviour” that is “connected to beliefs in supernatural beings, powers, or 
states and for that reason are designated ‘religious.’” However, it is not clear 
from his paper what sets religious institutions apart, if anything, from other 
kinds of institutional forms. That is, Wiebe’s argument is that “religions” main-
tain the boundary between in-group and out-group and thus function as 
behavioural immune systems, but he does not suggest what sets “religions” 
apart in this respect from other forms of identity that also set up such bound-
ary conditions. Perhaps a clue to his answer comes in his discussion of the role 
that false beliefs play in religions, but such beliefs are probably true of any 
institutionalized form of identity. In other words, what is it, if anything about 
the connection “to beliefs in supernatural beings, powers, or states” that sets 
“religions” apart from other institutions? If nothing sets religious institutions 
apart, then we cannot rightly call this a theory about religion(s), though it may 
be valuable for other reasons. Though Martin only uses the term religion five 
times in the body of his paper as far as I could see, and we do not really get a 
sense what he means by it, the same sort of argument applies to the function of 
ritual. That is, is there anything that sets religious rituals apart with regard to 
their supposed function?
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(5) Genre: is this science or religious studies (history of religions), or both?
All of this might sound like more of a critique than it is. The force of the cri-
tique, I think, comes down to a matter of genre. If I am reading Martin and 
Wiebe correctly—particular considering their unfulfilled wish, voiced in this 
year’s JAAR, to have a “comprehensive scientific study of religion” (2012, 588)—
they want to contribute a “scientific” theory of religion. Humanistic theories or 
examinations of religion almost always rely on just-so storytelling, Molièrian 
sleeping pills, Panglossian glasses, or some version of all three. This form of 
storytelling occurs because humanists in general are not that interested in 
escaping folk psychology but instead working within it for other purposes and 
aims than science (though often the aims are not as explicit). So were Martin 
and Wiebe content to stay within this genre, a critique of them for this type of 
reasoning would have no teeth (other criticisms, indeed, would be in play). 
However, they have other aspirations. The grass is always greener on the 
other side.8
In conclusion I want to say I am a bit puzzled by Martin and Wiebe’s recent 
statement in JAAR that they do not think a science of religion is possible. In 
part, I think their arguments show that such an undertaking is not not possible 
because of some fault on the side of scholars of religion. Such an undertaking 
is not possible because religion is not a legitimate object of scientific scrutiny 
(if we mean science in the Anglo-American sense, as opposed to the German/
Northern European sense, as wissenschaft or videnskab/vitenskap). As Fran-
kenberry puts it: “If most of the important questions in the study of religion are 
semantic in nature, not causal, then the forms of explanation that make refer-
ence to human beliefs, intentions, desires, etc. will never be displaced by sci-
ence, however developed that science eventually becomes” (2012: 599). I would 
like to think there is a compromise position between Frankenberry and Wiebe/
Martin—and thus a middle ground between causal and semantic theories, or 
at least some way for them to play nice together—but lately I am not so sure 
(Davis 2012: 105-114). Perhaps they can play nice if cognitivists stop insisting 
they have a special type of language. Science is a special type of language-game 
that I think works within certain confines (ceteris paribus clauses, etc., Day 
8 If they were content to stay within the humanistic perspective, I think Wiebe’s argument 
would be useful to students of religious biopolitics because part of the “behavioral immune sys-
tem” must concern sexual regulation of females. Such an account might help us make more sense 
of the emergence of a “jealous” god—jealous of a possibly unfaithful Israel—during the period in 
question (Assman 2004: 30). By the same token, Martin’s argument is illuminating in the context 
of recent humanistic work on anxiety (especially as it relates to place/space) and religion—reli-
gion producing the problem that it fixes.
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2007: 55, 60-61), but the humanistic study of religion does not work within 
those confines. So if Martin and Wiebe want to have their cake (religion/s) and 
eat it too, they need to accept that the use of the language of cognitive and 
evolutionary science in the study of religion does not entail a special kind of 
language that gives it priority over other types in the field. Cognitive and evo-
lutionary science are extremely powerful and useful tools that can help us be 
better scholars of religion, but they do not change the game in any substantial 
or essential way.
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